另外请见：
被美国通缉的总参黑客是如何暴露的？FBI从2011年开始顺藤摸瓜
http://jasmine-action.blogspot.com/2014/05/fbi2011.html
大快人心事，美国联邦调查局（FBI）公开通缉中共总参61398部队的五名军官。既然公开通缉中国现役军官了，那么下一步就是如何引渡这五人了。如果中国拒绝引渡，两国将面临战争危险。
美国司法部长霍德尔举行记者会表示，美国联邦法院的一个大陪审团已经裁定可以起诉五名中国军方人员。
路透社报道说，被告五人通过联网侵入美国的联合制钢、美利坚铝业、阿勒格尼技术公司以及一个工会组织。
外电报道说，美国司法部长霍德尔告诉记者，美国政府“不会容忍外国政府窃取美国企业的机密”。
美国之前曾经多次指责中国的机关部门向美国政府和民间企业发动网上袭击。
而中国也曾经反指中国政府部门和民间企业受到了来自美国方面的网上袭击。
去年，美国一间网路安全公司发表报告称，中国成立了网军部队，向美国联邦政府和民间企业发动袭击当中的绝大部分便是来自这支解放军属下的部队。
后来还有报道称，这支部队的正式番号为61398部队，并称部队位于上海。
美国司法部在记者会上证实被告五人均为61398部队第3支队成员，分别是（以下中文姓名均为译名）汪东（Wang Dong）、孙开亮（Sun Kailiang）、文新宇（ Wen Xinyu）、黄镇宇（ Huang Zhenyu）、古春辉（ Gu Chunhui）。
罪名分别是第一：意图进行电脑诈骗，第二：入侵电脑系统获取资料图利，第三：传送程式、信号、数码或者指令，以破坏受到保护之电脑、第四：重大窃取个人资料，第五：经济间谍、第六：窃取贸易机密，共31项控罪。
被通缉的五人是：
Gu Chunhui（古春辉）
Huang Zhenyu (黄镇宇）
Sun Kailiang (孙开亮）
Wang Dong （汪东）
Wen Xinyu （文新宇）
Gu Chunhui（古春辉）
Huang Zhenyu (黄镇宇）
Sun Kailiang (孙开亮）
Wang Dong （汪东）
Wen Xinyu （文新宇）
Summary of Defendants’ Conduct Alleged in the Indictment
Defendant | Victim | Criminal Conduct |
Sun | Westinghouse | In 2010, while Westinghouse was building four AP1000 power plants in China and negotiating other terms of the construction with a Chinese SOE (SOE-1), including technology transfers, Sun stole confidential and proprietary technical and design specifications for pipes, pipe supports, and pipe routing within the AP1000 plant buildings. Additionally, in 2010 and 2011, while Westinghouse was exploring other business ventures with SOE-1, Sun stole sensitive, non-public, and deliberative e-mails belonging to senior decision-makers responsible for Westinghouse’s business relationship with SOE-1. |
Wen | SolarWorld | In 2012, at about the same time the Commerce Department found that Chinese solar product manufacturers had “dumped” products into U.S. markets at prices below fair value, Wen and at least one other, unidentified co-conspirator stole thousands of files including information about SolarWorld’s cash flow, manufacturing metrics, production line information, costs, and privileged attorney-client communications relating to ongoing trade litigation, among other things. Such information would have enabled a Chinese competitor to target SolarWorld’s business operations aggressively from a variety of angles. |
Wang and Sun | U.S. Steel | In 2010, U.S. Steel was participating in trade cases with Chinese steel companies, including one particular state-owned enterprise (SOE-2). Shortly before the scheduled release of a preliminary determination in one such litigation, Sun sent spearphishing e-mails to U.S. Steel employees, some of whom were in a division associated with the litigation. Some of these e-mails resulted in the installation of malware on U.S. Steel computers. Three days later, Wang stole hostnames and descriptions of U.S. Steel computers (including those that controlled physical access to company facilities and mobile device access to company networks). Wang thereafter took steps to identify and exploit vulnerable servers on that list. |
Wen | ATI | In 2012, ATI was engaged in a joint venture with SOE-2, competed with SOE-2, and was involved in a trade dispute with SOE-2. In April of that year, Wen gained access to ATI’s network and stole network credentials for virtually every ATI employee. |
Wen | USW | In 2012, USW was involved in public disputes over Chinese trade practices in at least two industries. At or about the time USW issued public statements regarding those trade disputes and related legislative proposals, Wen stole e-mails from senior USW employees containing sensitive, non-public, and deliberative information about USW strategies, including strategies related to pending trade disputes. USW’s computers continued to beacon to the conspiracy’s infrastructure until at least early 2013. |
Sun | Alcoa | About three weeks after Alcoa announced a partnership with a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE-3) in February 2008, Sun sent a spearphishing e-mail to Alcoa. Thereafter, in or about June 2008, unidentified individuals stole thousands of e-mail messages and attachments from Alcoa’s computers, including internal discussions concerning that transaction. |
Huang | Huang facilitated hacking activities by registering and managing domain accounts that his co-conspirators used to hack into U.S. entities. Additionally, between 2006 and at least 2009, Unit 61398 assigned Huang to perform programming work for SOE-2, including the creation of a “secret” database designed to hold corporate “intelligence” about the iron and steel industries, including information about American companies. | |
Gu | Gu managed domain accounts used to facilitate hacking activities against American entities and also tested spearphishing e-mails in furtherance of the conspiracy. |
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61398部队是中国网络部队的部分证据（有图有真相）原文网址： http://jasmine-action.blogspot.com/2013/02/61398_20.html
啥都别说了，全在图里！
另外，中共总参三部间谍郭盈华和严文明都属于61398部队，郭盈华和严文明是由总参三部派到上海理工大学代培研究生，然后到61398部队服役。见下面的链接。
中共总参间谍郭盈华和中软公司策动了对摩根斯坦利和花旗的网络攻击！（中文版）
中文网址：http://jasmine-action.blogspot.com/2013/02/blog-post_13.html
英文网址: http://jasmine-action.blogspot.com/2013/02/why-and-how-morgan-stanley-and.html
61398部队司令部所在地：上海市浦东新区高桥镇大同路208号。
61398部队司令部主楼。
浙江大学为黑客部队61398部队定向代培黑客硕士生。
61398被部队黑客高手宋四根发表的有关黑客技术的论文。
61398部队同中国电信签订合同，要求无偿使用中国电信的光纤网络。这意味着中国网络部队可以随时监控中国电信的各种通讯信息，可以用中国电信的光纤网络对世界各地通讯网络进行渗透、监控，以及盗取世界各地的通讯信息和敏感数据。中国的光纤网络实际上成为中国军队监控本国私人通信以及渗透外国网络的切入口。
黑客部队黑客军官的集体婚礼。
黑客部队黑客军官的集体婚礼。
黑客部队黑客军官的集体婚礼。
黑客部队黑客军官的集体婚礼。
唐宇华是中共派驻北美地区的最大特务头子。唐宇华于2011年11月被美国FBI逮捕归案。
郭盈华（英文名 Elisa Guo）是61398部队的上校军官。被总参三部派往美国潜伏，目前在美国辉瑞制药公司（Pfizer）纽约总部任高管。
郭盈华原本在惠氏制药公司（Wyeth）市场规划部。2009年，在郭盈华及中国总参的运作下，辉瑞制药成功兼并了惠氏制药公司。兼并之后，郭盈华所在的市场规划部的上百名雇员，无一被辉瑞录用，郭盈华不仅得到辉瑞录用，而且提职重用。盖因郭盈华以及中国总参握有辉瑞兼并惠氏制药的幕后非法操作细节。Pfizer明知郭盈华是中国总参间谍，也明知郭盈华的简历中造假，但依旧重用她，而且派律师恐吓威胁举报郭盈华的人。
唐宇华（戴眼镜者）是中共派驻北美地区的最大特务头子。这是唐宇华同郭盈华（中间站立者）在2009年9月会面的一个镜头。这两人经常会面交流情报，商讨对美国发动网络袭击的策略。2011年，郭盈华伙同唐宇华并联手中软公司对美国银行摩根斯坦利和花旗银行发动网络袭击。
严文明是61398部队的上校军官。2009年9月，严文明专程从上海来到美国给郭盈华送6万美金活动经费，并向郭盈华提供有关的网络袭击技术和指导。这是严文明专程从上海到纽约后同郭盈华一道参加画展。
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